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IS THE 
SUPREME COURT 
O:P THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
TRACY COLLINS BANK AND 
TRUST CO., 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
CASE NO. 14,125 FIRST SECURITY STATE BANK, 
and UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT 
CO. , et al., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT 
TRACY COLLINS BANK AND TRUST CO., 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a trust deed foreclosure action, wherein Plaintiff/ 
Respondent Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company, (herein 
referred to as "Plaintiff"), brought suit to foreclose a 
trust deed on property situate in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, and joined, among others, Appellants First Security 
State Bank (herein referred to as "First Security") and Utah 
Title and Abstract Company (herein referred to as "Utah 
Title") as Defendants. First Security, as Beneficiary, also 
prayed for foreclosure of its trust deed (of which Utah 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Title is Trustee) against the same property. The question 
presented on appeal is whether Plaintiff is entitled to 
priority over the lien of First Security, as the Trial Court 
found, by virtue of the fact that Plaintiff's trust deed on 
the subject property was a valid and enforceable lien executed 
and recorded five months prior to the trust deed of First 
Security. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court, the Honorable Ernest F* Baldwin, 
Jr., presiding, found that Plaintiff's trust deed had priority 
over First Security's trust deed and awarded judgment of 
foreclosure giving Plaintiff the right to the first proceeds 
derived from the foreclosure sale, subject only to the claim 
of Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary District No. 1. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Respondent seeks affirmcince of the Trial 
Court's judgment that Plaintiff's lien has priority over the 
lien of First Security and an award of attornies' fees 
incurred in defense of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff accepts Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Defendants'/Appel-
lants1 Statement of Facts. Plaintiff controverts Paragraphs 
3 through 8 of Defendants'/Appellants' Statement of Facts, 
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the same violating the fundamental rule of appellate procedure 
that the facts are to be taken in the light most favorable 
to the lower court's decision; Defendants'/Appellants1 facts 
are argumentative only and do not reflect the basis of the 
court's decision. Plaintiff offers the following proper 
Statement of Facts: 
On December 13, 1972, Defendant Richard Seiger made and 
delivered to Plaintiff his promissory note in the sum of 
$55,974.70, the proceeds of which Plaintiff disbursed in 
payment for bicycles received by Seiger (R.258, Exhibit 3P). 
The face of said note shows that it was due on February 12, 
1973, and that interest thereon accrued at the rate of nine 
percent (9%) per annum until maturity and twelve percent 
(12%) per annum thereafter. Defendant Richard Seiger defaulted 
in payment of said note (R.261), and, following negotiations 
between Plaintiff and Defendants Richard and Connie Seiger 
(represented by their attorney), said Defendants executed 
and delivered to Plaintiff their promissory note, dated 
March 14, 1973, in the amount of $50,000.00 (Exhibit IP, 
R.259). As security for payment of said note, Defendants 
Richard and Connie Seiger contemporaneously executed and 
delivered to Plaintiff a trust deed, dated March 14, 1973, 
covering the property which is the subject of this action? 
said trust deed was recorded on March 16, 1973 (Exhibit 2P, 
R.259, 260). 
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Said promissory note and trust deed (Exhibits IP and 
2P) were given to induce Plaintiff to forbear from collection 
of the promissory note of December 13, 1972 (Exhibit 3P), 
which was then in default (R.261, 264). As further consideration, 
Plaintiff made several additional concessions to Defendants 
Seiger, i.e.: (a) that the proceeds of the loan would be 
placed in an "undisbursed ban control" account, without 
interest until June 1, 1973 (an extension of 108 days on the 
original note), (b) that Plaintiff would immediately release 
25 bicycles held by it as security for payment of the original 
note, and that additional bicyclers would be released in 
increments of 25 bicycles as sales thereof were made and 
payments therefor were paid to Plaintiff, (c) that Defendant 
Richard Seiger could locate and furnish a suitable warehouse, 
acceptable to the Plaintiff, for storage of bicycles (Exhibit 
4P, R.284). Additionally, the faces of the promissory notes 
dated December 13, 1972 and March 14, 1973 (Exhibits 3P and 
IP) show that the interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum 
being charged against the December 13, 1972 promissory note 
then in default was reduced to nine percent (9%) per annum. 
Defendant Seiger defaulted in payment of the March 14, 
1973 promissory note (Exhibit IP) and at his request Plaintiff 
gave him several further extensions of time in which to pay 
said note (R.265,266). The note still being unpaid on May 
10, 1974, funds were disbursed therefrom in payment of the 
December 13, 1972 note (Exhibit 3P) (R.266). The said note 
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(Exhibit IP) remains unpaid and the balance due thereon, 
with interest from May 10, 1974 to April 3, 1975 is $50,349*41 
(Exhibit 13P). 
On August 24, 1974 Mr. and Mrs. Jerry D. Timothy, 
Defendant Seigers' successors in interest to the subject 
property, executed a promissory note in the amount of $40,000.00 
to First Security, which note was secured by a trust deed on 
the subject property, executed by Mr. and Mrs. Timothy on 
August 24, 1974, and recorded August 28, 1974 (R.290, 291, 
Exhibits 9D and 10D). Mr. and Mrs. Timothy defaulted in 
payment of said note (R.292) and First Security foreclosed 
said trust deed as a part of the instant action. There is 
no evidence as to the date First Security disbursed funds 
under said promissory note. 
ARGUMENT 
In this action, Plaintiff foreclosed its trust deed as 
a mortgage. For the purposes of the following argument, 
Plaintiff has treated the terms "trust deed" and "mortgage" 
as being synonomous inasmuch as both are lien instruments 
affecting real property. The legal distinction between the 
two terms is not pertinent to the issues herein discussed. 
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POINT I 
PLAINTIFF'S PROMISSORY NOTE AND TRUST DEED ARE SUPPORTED 
BY ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION TO ESTABLISH ITS PRIORITY 
OF MARCH 14, 1973. 
The sufficiency and validity of the consideration given 
by Plaintiff for execution and delivery by Defendants Seiger 
of the March 14, 1973 promissory note and trust deed (Exhibits 
IP and 2P) are established by any one of four independant 
alternatives: (A) The promissory note and trust deed were 
executed to secure a bona fide pre-exirsting liability; (B) 
the promissory note and trust deed were executed and delivered 
as an inducement to Plaintiff to forbear any action upon 
other delinquent debts of the Defendant Seiger; (C) Plaintiff 
relinquished several rights and obligations due it by the 
Defendant Seiger; and (D) the promissory note and trust deed 
were executed to secure future disbursements of funds, which 
disbursements were in fact made. 
Each of the above alternatives is established by the 
evidence adduced at trial and each, standing alone, is 
sufficient to establish the validity of Plaintiff's promissory 
note and trust deed and its priority date of March 16, 1973; 
cumulatively, the alternatives compel an affirmance of the 
trial court1s judgment. Each of the alternatives, and its 
legal significance is discussed as follows: 
A# Pre-existing Debt as Consideration. The uncontradicted 
evidence in this case is that the trust deed of March 14, 
1973 was given by the Defendants Seiger to secure payment of 
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an antecedent debt which was then in default, said antecedent 
debt being reflected by the $55,974.70 promissory note of 
December 13, 1972 (Exhibit 3P) and being further acknowledged 
by the $50,000.00 promissory note of March 14, 1973 (Exhibit 
IP). It is clear that under both the statutory law and the 
case law of Utah a trust deed given to secure an antecedent 
debt is supported by adequate consideration. 
The statutory expression of the law is found at Section 
70A-3-4Q8, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), which 
provides s 
Want or failure of consideration is a defense . . . 
except that no consideration is necessary for an 
instrument or obligation thereon given in payment of or 
as security for an antecedent obligation of any kind, 
(emphasis added) 
The official comment contained in the Uniform Commercial 
Code with respect to this section states the purpose thereof 
as follows: 
2. The "except" clause is intended to remove the 
difficulties which have arisen where a note or a draft 
. . . is given as payment or as security for a debt 
already owed by the pcirty giving it, or by a third 
persono The provision is intended to change the result 
of decisions holding that where no extension of time or 
other concession is given by the creditor the new 
obligation fails for lack of legal consideration . . . 
The doctrine is similarly expressed in the case law. 
In Abraham v. Abraham, 15 U.2d 430, 394 P.2d 385 (1964), 
this Court considered the effect of a first mortgage and 
underlying note given to the mortgagee in consideration of 
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an antecedent indebtedness and for a further advancement of 
cash. In concluding that the mortgage and underlying note 
were supported by adequate consideration, thereby giving 
priority over a second mortgage, the Court quoted from 59 
C.J.S. Mortgages §95a, P.135, as follows: 
Where a note and mortgage to secure it are executed 
contemporaneously and as part of the same transaction, 
the consideration sustaining the note will sustain the 
mortgage. 
The Court further quoted from Glenn on Mortgages, Volume 3, 
Section 383.2, P.1566 as follows: 
If, then, the debtor secures his antecedent 
indebtedness by executing a negotiable note and 
securing it by mortgage, . . . the creditor holds the 
security free from latent equities, for he is a bona 
fide purchaser within the law of commercial paper. (15 
U.2d 431, 394 P.2d 386). 
To the same effect, see Bowman v. White, 13 U.2d 173, 369 
P.2d 962 (1962); McCallister v. Farmers Development Company, 
55 P.2d 657 (N.M. 1936); State Bank of Down v. Criswell, 
124 P.2d 500 (Kan. 1942); Campbell v. Bagley, 276 F.2d 28, 
33 (5th Cir., 1960). 
This Court, in the Abraham case, supra., quoted favorably 
from 59 C.J.S. Mortgages. Section 91 of 59 C.J.S. Mortgages 
summarizes the state of the law as follows: 
A pre-existing debt or liability is a sufficient 
consideration to support a mortgage given as security 
therefor, and there need not be a new consideration at 
the time of the making of the mortgage. (Citing cases) 
The uncontroverted evidence in the instant case clearly 
ablished that the Defendant Richard Seiger was previously 
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indebted to Plaintiff in the sum of approximately $56,000.00 
prior to execution of the March 14, 1973 promissory note. 
(R.261, 262, 263, 266, 279). The note and trust deed of 
March 14, 1973 (Exhibits IP and 2P) were clearly given to 
secure that pre-existing liability. As such, they were 
adequately supported by valid consideration on the date of 
recording and Plaintiff's priority date as to its lien on 
the subject property must be determined to be March 16, 
1973, and prior to the lien of First Security, and the trial 
court so found at Paragraph (4)(a) of its Findings of Fact 
where it stated: 
As evidence of and as security for payment of the 
pre-existing debt represented by the Promissory Note 
dated December 13, 1972, which debt was due and payable 
on February 12, 1973, and was in default on and before 
March 14, 1973. (R.197) 
B. Forbearance as Consideration. The Courts in many 
jurisdictions have held that a creditor's forbearance to sue 
upon a past due obligation is sufficient consideration for a 
new note and trust deed securing a promise to pay. The 
applicable law is well stated by the authors of 59 C.J.S. 
Mortgages, §92, as follows: 
. . . [T]he forbearance of a creditor to enforce 
a payment of a debt or claim by legal proceedings or 
his extension of the time for payment of the debt or 
interest thereon may constitute a sufficient consideration 
for a mortgage. . . . 
The rational of the Courts in establishing the foregoing 
principle is clear. By forbearing any action on delinquent 
-9-
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debts, the creditor detrimentally extends further credit to 
an already proven poor risk, and the debtor is benefited by 
that extension as well as by saving the forfeiture of any 
security given for the prior debt. In In re Las Colinas, Inc., 
294 F.Supp. 582, 596 (D.P.R. 1968), the federal district 
court stated the appropriate lav; as follows: 
A contract without consideration is wholly void 
and nonexistent and has no effect whatsoever (Citing 
cases). But the fact that no money or property was 
received by the debtor from the creditor at the time an 
obligation is subscribed by the former, does not preclude 
the existence of consideration in said note. (Citing 
cases) Any detriment to the opposite party is a valuable 
consideration. (Citing cases) As a matter of law, 
where a promissory note is subscribed by a debtor in 
substitution for other prior obligations, the fact that 
no money or property is received from the creditor by 
virtue of the obligation thus subscribed, does not 
preclude the existence of consideration in said note, 
and a debtor can not avoid liability by claiming that 
no benefit was received. (Citing cases) 
Similar results have been reached by the Courts in 
Oil Tool Exchange, Inc. v. Schuh, 153 P.2d 976, 980 (Calif. 
1944); Havel v. Havel, 66 P.2d 399 (Kan. 1937); Hahn v. Hahn, 
266 P.2d 519 (Calif. 1954); and Russell v. Russell, 120 So.2d 733, 
738 (Ala. 1960). The Oklahoma Supreme Court was faced with 
a factual issue substantially similar to the instant facts 
in A & S Distributing Company v. Nail-Tucker, Inc., 428 P.2d 
254 (Okla. 1967) where several creditors contested the 
validity of a trust deed held by a senior creditor. The 
Plaintiff had obtained a trust deed from the debtor in 
November, 1961, duplicating its security of a chattel mortgage. 
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In December, 1961, Defendant obtained a note and trust deed 
on the same property. Subsequently, in October, 1962, 
Plaintiff renewed the 1961 note, which note had been secured 
by the trust deed of November, 1961. The Oklahoma Court 
held that the November, 1961, trust deed was security for a 
pre-existing debt and that the credit extension in 1962 was 
a forbearance by Plaintiff of action on that pre-existing 
debt. Accordingly, the Court determined that Plaintiff's 
notes and trust deed were supported by sufficient consideration 
and that Plaintiff's lien was prior to and superior to those 
held by Defendant. 
In the instant case, the uncontradicted evidence shows 
that the Seiger trust deed to Plaintiff was executed and 
delivered as an inducement to Plaintiff to forbear bringing 
any action on the delinquent note of December 13, 1972. 
(R.261, R.264, R.284). Plaintiff's witness specifically 
testified as follows: 
[T]he $55,000.00 note — was at that point past 
due and we — our bank had gotten together with Mr» 
Seiger and his counsel and indicated that we wanted our 
money and the $50,000.00 note Wc.s taken to induce the 
bank to forbear against closing on that Note at that 
point. (R.261) 
Clearly, Plaintiff's forbearance to collect the debt which 
was then past due and in default was, standing alone, adequate 
consideration for the execution and delivery of the note and 
trust deed of March 14, 1973, and the trial court so found 
at Paragraphs (4)(b), (c) and (d) of its Findings of Fact 
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wherein it stated: 
[The note and trust deed were given] 
(b) In consideration of Plaintiff's extension of 
time in which to pay the debt evidenced by the Promissory 
Note dated December 13, 1972, from February 12, 1973, 
to June 1, 1973 and thereafter. 
(c) As an inducement to plaintiff to forbear from 
collection of the debt evidenced by the Promissory Note 
dated December 13, 1972, which Note was in default 
after February 12, 1973, and was in default on March 
14# 1973, 
(d) As additional security for payment of defendants 
Seiger's debts and as an inducement to plaintiff to 
forbear from collection of such debts and to extend the 
time for payment thereof, (R*197,198) 
There being sufficient consideration, Plaintiff's March 16, 
1973 priority date must be affirmed. 
C. Relinquishment by Plaintiff of Rights and Obligations 
Due It. The uncontradicted evidence in this case further 
shows that in addition to the antecedent debt owed by Defendant 
Seiger and Plaintiff's forbearance to sue, Plaintiff relinquished 
several substantial rights. The relinquishment of these 
rights also constitutes sufficient consideration for the 
promissory note and trust deed of March 14, 1973 and the 
validity of Plaintiff's March 16, 1973 priority date. These 
additional rights are as follows: 
Plaintiff reduced the interest on the antecedent debt 
from twelve percent (12%) per annum to nine percent (9%) per 
annum, as shown on the faces of the promissory notes (Exhibits 
IP and 3P). Simple mathematics show that on the principal 
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amount now due of $46,511.51f the period from March 14, 1973 
to trial on April 3, 1975, this reduction of interest saved 
Defendants Seiger and cost Plaintiff the sum of $2,860.52. 
Obviously, the execution of the new promissory note and 
trust deed operated as a substantial benefit to Defendants 
Seiger and a substantial detriment to Plaintiff. 
Additionally, the faces of the two notes show that 
Plaintiff extended the due date of the original obligation 
from February 12, 1973 to June 1, 1973, an extension of 108 
days (Exhibits IP and 3P). Defendants Seiger had the use of 
the money for an cidditional 108 days without obligation to 
repay the same during said period. Thus a substantial 
benefit was conferred on Defendants Seiger to Plaintiff's 
detriment. 
Plaintiff also authorized the immediate release of 25 
bicycles, which it held as security for payment of the 
original note (Exhibit 4P, R„264) in order that Defendant 
Seiger could show the same to potential customers and, 
hopefully, effect a sale thereof. Again, Plaintiff's action 
acted as a benefit to Defendants Seiger and a detriment to 
Plaintiff in that Plaintiff gave up physical custody of its 
collateral security. 
Finally, Plaintiff permitted Defendant Seiger to place 
the remaining bicycles in which Plaintiff held a collateral 
security interest in a warehouse of his own choosing. 
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(Exhibit 4P, R.264). The record is silent as to the effect 
of Plaintiff's action but it must be assumed that such 
action was of substantial benefit to Defendants Seiger. If 
not, why would his counsel negotiate for such authorization? 
Each of the foregoing benefits/detriments individually 
constitutes sufficient consideration for the promissory note 
and trust deed of March 14, 1973 under fundamental contract 
law on consideration. The black letter rule is stated in 
C.J.S. as follows: 
There is a sufficient consideration for a promise 
if there is any benefit to the promisor or any detriment 
to the promisee, h benefit need not necessarily 
accrue to the promisor if a detriment to the promisee 
is present, and there is a consideration if the promisee 
does anything legal which he is not bound to do or 
refrains from doing anything which he has a right to 
do, whether or not there is any actual loss or detriment 
to him or actual benefit to the promisor. 17 C.J.So 
Contracts, §74. 
And this Court, in Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 
608, 237 P.2d 823 (1951) quoted Williston on Contracts, 
Revised Edition, Volume I, Section 103F: 
"[N]o briefer definition of sufficient considera-
tion in a bilateral contract can be given then this: 
Mutual promises in each of which the promisor undertakes 
some act or forbearance that will be, or apparently may 
be, detrimental to the promisor or beneficial to the 
promisee, and neither of which is void, are sufficient 
consideration for one another." 120 Utah 613, 237 P.2d 
825. 
And again, the authors of C.J.S. have related the forgoing 
rule in 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §90, as follows: 
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"The rule applicable to contracts generally that the 
adequacy of the consideration, as long as it is a 
valuable consideration, is immaterial in the absence of 
fraud . . . applies in the case of a mortgage. A 
mortgage will not be held invalid for want of consi-
deration if it is supported by any consideration 
recognized by the law as sufficient to sustain a 
promise to pay. The consideration may be a benefit 
moving to the mortgagor,- or may consist in a detriment 
to the mortgagee although there is no actual benefit to 
the mortgagor, but there must be some benefit to one 
party or some injury or detriment to the other. 
(Citing cases) 
Clearly the benefits to the Defendants Seiger and the 
detriments to Plaintiff compel a determination that Plaintiff's 
promissory note and trust deed of March 14, 1973 were supported 
by valid consideration and, that consideration being effective 
as of the date of recordation, determination that Plaintiff's 
priority date is March 16, 1973 is compelled, and the trial 
court so found at Paragraphs (4)(e) through (j) of its 
Findings of Fact wherein it stated: 
[The note and trust deed were given] 
(e) In consideration of plaintiff's agreement 
that no funds would be dispersed thereunder prior to 
June 1, 1973, at which time all sums due and owing to 
plaintiff would be due and payable. 
(f) In consideration of plaintiff's agreement 
that no interest would be charged thereon until the 
funds represented thereby were dispersed. 
(g) In consideration of plaintiff's agreement to 
release twenty-five bicycles then held by it as security 
for pre-existing debts and to periodically release 
additional bicycles. 
(h) In consideration of plaintiff's agreement to 
permit defendant Richard Seiger to locate and furnish 
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at his expense a suitable warehouse for storage of the 
bicycles held by plaintiff as security for payment of 
pre-existing debts due from defendants Seiger. 
(i) In consideration of the reduction of interest 
from twelve percent (12%) per annum to nine percent 
(9%) per annum. 
(j) Defendant Connie Seiger gave such Promissory 
Note and Trust Deed as an accomodation to plaintiff and 
to defendant Richard Seiger in addition to the foregoing 
considerations. (R.19 8) 
D. Plaintiff' s Disbursement of^JPu^l^J^^ 
In addition to the consideration shown in sub-sections A, B, 
and C above, the disbursement of funds under the March 14, 
1973 note constitutes substantial consideration and supports 
the trust deed given as security for payment thereof. As 
early as 1919, the Supreme Court of Virginia recognized the 
predominant and logical business policy of first obtaining 
security and then disbursing funds, wherein it stated: 
In the business world, nothing is more common than 
the execution of such securities [trust deeds], in 
contemplation of a loan. 
* * * 
As soon as the note is negotiated, the liability 
to take care of it arises, and the holder's right to the 
security attaches. CD. Van Nostrand & Co., v. Virginia 
Zinc & Chemical Corp. , 101 Southeast 65, 68 (Va. 1919). 
(emphasis added) 
The Virginia court then found adequate consideration for a trust 
deed given as security for funds subsequently disbursed by the 
creditor. Neither the law nor the business practice has changed 
in the intervening 56 years and other courts have readily 
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followed this practical policy, for to do otherwise would wreak 
havoc in the credit industry, See for example Whiddon v. Forshee, 
184 S.E. 2d 349 (Ga. 1971) and Strangi v. Wilson, 77 So. 2d 
697 (Miss. 1955). In the Strangi case, the Mississippi 
court similarly held that the trust deed was supported by 
adequate consideration arising from Plaintiff's subsequent 
disbursements of funds which related back to the execution 
of the trust deed, validating it from its date of execution. 
Therefore, Plaintiff's claim was saperior to that of subsequent 
creditors of Defendant. 
In 1969, the Supreme Court of Maryland in Stack v. Marney, 
248 A.2d 880, citing Nostrand, supra., with approval recognized 
59 C.J.S. Mortgages, §89 as stating the "general rule." 
That section of C.J.S., which considers the time of transfer 
of funds as affecting the validity of the consideration for 
a trust deed, states: 
"The consideration need not pass at the time of the 
execution of the mortgage; that may be either a prior 
or subsequent matter . . . [C]onsideration subsequently 
furnished by the purchasers of the note will relate back 
and sustain the mortgage . . ."
 0
 f9
 (Citing cases, 
emphasis added) 
By disbursing funds under the March 14, 1973 note on May 10, 
1974, Plaintiff has provided consideration for the Seiger 
trust deed, and the trial court so found at Paragraph (4)(k) 
of its Findings and Fact wherein it stated: 
Plaintiff dispersed funds from the Promissory Note 
on May 10, 1974, in the amount of $48,323.51; said 
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disbursement did not create the debt herein, since the 
underlying debt for which the Trust Deed was given had 
been in existence since December 13, 1972, and was in 
existence on March 14, 1973. (R.198) 
That disbursement "relates back and sustains" the trust deed 
and thereby makes this Plaintiff's claim to the property 
superior to all others. ^ ,
 r 
The trust deed in favor of Plaintiff Tracy-Collins Bank 
and Trust Company cannot be attacked for lack of consideration. 
By statutory law, Utah case law, and the overwhelming majority 
of case law in other jurisdictions, the trust deed may be 
sustained on any one of four separate bases: It secures a 
pre-existing debt; it was executed to induce Plaintiff to 
forbear action on a delinquent debt; Plaintiff suffered 
substantial economic and actual detriment to Defendant 
Seigers1 benefit; and, funds were actually disbursed under 
the promissory note which said trust deed secured. Each of 
these bases constitutes sufficient consideration standing 
alone -- cumulatively, they constitute unquestionable considera-
tion. Accordingly, the validity of Plaintiff's trust deed 
as of March 14, 1973 and its priority date as of the date of 
recording of March 16, 1973 must be affirmed. 
Fundamental principles of Appellate procedure require 
this Court to affirm the trial court's Judgment unless 
clearly erroneous. This Court and others have consistently 
held under the provisions of Rule 72, Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure, and cases annotated thereunder, that the findings 
of the trial court will be affirmed if there is any competent 
evidence to support them. See Martin vs. Martin, 29 U.2d 
413, 415, 510 P.2d 1102 (1973); Harper vs Tri-State Motors, Inc., 
90 Utah 212, 222, 58 P.2d 18, rehearing denied 90 Utah 226, 
63 P.2d 1056 (1936). The foregoing argument clearly demonstrates 
that the trial court had ample evidence before it to support 
its findings. Similarly, the foregoing argument clearly 
demonstrates that the trial court accurately applied the 
applicable law, the Court's Judgment must be affirmed. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT FOR LIEN PRIORITY IGNORES THE FACT 
THAT THE TRUST DEED TO PLAINTIFF WAS EXECUTED 
FOR VALID CONSIDERATION. 
Appellant's arguments center around the contention that 
the 1973 trust deed executed by the Defendants Seiger was 
not perfected until 1974, when funds were disbursed under 
the note executed contemporaneously with the trust deed. 
Appellant's argument is meritorious only if, as of March 14, 
1974, no consideration supported the promissory note and 
trust deed. However, Plaintiff's discussion under Point I 
hereof, supra, amply shows that there was consideration 
given on March 14, 1973. Accordingly, Appellants' argument 
must fail. 
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Appellants concede that an antecedent debt may act as 
the indebtedness for a new note and mortgage (App. Brief 
p.17). As previously discussed, it cannot be questioned 
that the note of March 14, 1973 was given in recognition of 
the antecedent debt of the note of December 13, 1972. The 
evidence at trial clearly established, and the trial court 
so found, that the 1973 trust deed was given to Plaintiff in 
consideration of a pre-existing debt created by Defendant 
Richard Seiger's promissory note of December 13, 1972, which 
note was in default at the time of execution of the trust 
deed and promissory note of March 14, 1973. The trust deed 
was executed primarily as security for the overdue note in 
return for an extension of time in which to pay the debt, a 
reduction of interest, forbearance to sue, and other real 
and substantial consideration. 
Appellants claim, however, that in spite of the foregoing 
well established facts and principles, Plaintiff's trust 
deed was not "perfected" until a bookkeeping entry in 1974 
recorded the disbursement of funds under the 1973 note to 
cover the still unpaid amounts due under the original 1972 
note. However, the arguments they advance to support this 
contention avoid the fact of the antecedent debt and other 
consideration. 
Section 70A-3-408, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as 
amended) specifically negates the requirement of consideration 
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where an instrument is given in payment of antecedent obligations. 
That section states: 
". . [N]o consideration is necessary for an instru-
ment or obligation thereon given in payment of or 
as security for an antecedent obligation of any kind, 
(emphasis added) 
Most of the Appellants' cases cited in support of their 
argument are cases in which no consideration for the mortgage 
existed when the mortgage was executed, and the mortgage 
instrument operated only to secure future advances. However, 
this is far from actuality and in direct contravention of 
the evidence before the trial court. 
Appellant's cases discussing perfection of security 
agreements providing for optional future advances are grounded 
on two basic fact situations. In one, the mortgage secures 
no prior debt, and the mortgage is therefore not perfected 
until funds are actually disbursed, because no debt, obligation, 
or other consideration exists until then. This is logical, 
since no value is given or owing at the time of the execution 
of the mortgage. In the instant case, however, Defendants 
Seiger were already indebted to the Plaintiff for the amount 
of the note then due, $55,978.91 on March 16, 1973 (Exhibit 
3P), and Plaintiff extended the time in which they were to 
pay said indebtedness, reduced the interest rate, and agreed 
to forbear from collection of the past due indebtedness, 
along with other sufficient consideration. Clearly, there 
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was substantial value given at the time of execution of the 
trust deed. ••Tu^ . 
In the second type of case cited by Appellants, a 
debtor already in debt to several creditors, executes a 
mortgage on real property held by him in order to secure a 
small additional loan. At that point, the secured creditor 
buys the claims of the prior unsecured creditors and fore-
closes on the mortgage. This is the source of the "Anaconda 
mortgage" mentioned by Appellant. In such cases, where a 
mortgage recites that future advances are also secured by 
the mortgage instrument, and an unscrupulous creditor has 
taken advantage of the debtor, the terns of the mortgage 
instrument should indeed be subject to close scrutiny. The 
cases are not, however, pertinent here*. Plaintiff has not 
taken advantage of Defendants Seiger by making future advances 
inasmuch as the advances made are exactly as promised and 
disclosed to the Defendants. 
Appellant's remaining citations of authorities regarding 
optional future advances and mortgages all seem to deal with 
a situation in which there is no valuable consideration for 
the mortgage at the time the mortgage is executed. As 
mentioned before, these references beg the question of the 
validity of consideration as shown in Point I of this Brief, 
supra. 
An authority relied on by Appellants makes this distinction 
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clear. At page 15 of their Brief, Appellants quote from 
Osborne on Mortgages, Section 114 (1951). Plaintiff has 
been unable to find the passage quoted by Appellants, but 
the following pertinent language found in the section cited 
by Appellants is apropos: 
"• • »[E]ven where the [future] advances are non-
obligatory, there is almost invariably present consideration 
in the form of a concurrent advance, forbearance to sue, 
or other conduct by the mortgagee sufficient to make the 
mortgagor's promise immediately binding . . . [I]t would 
be an extremely rare case in which the obligatory or 
non-obligatory character of the advances would have any 
bearing on the question of when the entire mortgage 
obligation arose or of its enforceability between the 
parties as of the date of its execution. In both kinds 
of advances, repayment by the mortgagor is subject to 
the condition precedent that the mortgagee make the 
advances, and in both the promise to pay, if the condition 
is performed, is equally enforceable, although in no 
case, of course, beyond the amount actually advanced. 
That all this is so has been obscrued, perhaps, by the 
distinction drawn in the cases between the two sorts of 
advances in determining priority over other encumbrances, 
and the explanation given in some of them that, in the 
optional advance cases, no mortgage can arise until the 
advance is made because before then there exists no 
debt to secure. (Footnote omitted) (Osborn, supra, 
Section 114 at 278.) (emphasis added) 
By the above language, Osborn has recognized that there are 
a number of forms of consideration which will support perfection 
of the security interest at the time the trust deed is 
executed, even though advances on the amount referred to 
therein are actually made later. In the instant case, in 
addition to the antecedent debt which was in default at the 
time of execution of the trust deed, the trust deed was also 
entered into in consideration of the other factors described 
previously. 
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The law, the subject of considerable confusion among 
the courts, is based on common sense principles. Judicial 
focus on whether or not a debt actually underlies a mortgage, 
and the distinction between obligatory and optional future 
advances recited in mortgages, simply demonstrates a commendable 
concern over whether or not any value has been given for 
execution of the mortgage. If some value was given prior to 
or contemporaneous with execution of the mortgage, the 
mortgage attaches at the time of its execution. If in fact 
no value is given until a subsequent time, then there is 
reason to be concerned over whether the advances are optional 
or obligatory, since there should be some certainty that the 
mortgagee will in fact be obligated to give value at some 
future time. 
Under Utah law, "value" includes any consideration that 
would support a simple contract, including rights acquired 
"as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a 
pre-existing claim." (Section 78-1-201)(44)(d) and (b), 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)). However, the 
niceties of legal construction of future advance provisions 
become irrelevant where, as in this case, it is clearly 
i 
established that the trust deed was entered into with the 
understanding on the part of both parties that it was given 
to secure a pre-existing obligation of the debtor and with 
clear and substantial other considerations. 
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Two policies, in addition to concern with whether or 
not any value has passed to the debtor, seem to lie at the 
heart of the question of perfection of security interests 
involving future advances. The first is that creditors 
should be given adequate notice of the fact that property 
has been encumbered by a mortgage for a specific amount, and 
the second is that such security agreement should secure 
future advances only so long as they bear some reasonable 
relationship to the initial advance, In this case, the fact 
that the disbursements made in 1974 under the 1973 note bore 
a reasonable relationship to the advance made by Plaintiff 
in 1972 cannot, and has not, been questioned. With respect 
to the first consideration, the note recited as consideration 
in the 1973 trust deed is certainly adequate to put creditors 
on notice that the property is encumbered to the extent of 
the $50,000.00 described specifically by the trust deed, 
as well as any future advances to be made by Plaintiff. The 
reference to the 1973 note in the trust deed certainly 
furnishes actual notice to any creditor that the property is 
encumbered to that extent, and serves to put subsequent 
creditors on notice to inquire of the bank as to the facts 
underlying the $50,000.00 note. 
Appellants quarrel at this time appears to be based 
upon the fact that they either overlooked the clear recordation 
of Plaintiff's prior lien, or disregarded the same. Plaintiff's 
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trust deed was of record in the Office of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder, and "one who deals with real property is 
charged with notice of what is shown by the records of the 
County Recorder of the County in which the property is 
situated." Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 70, 1 P.2d* 
242. Section 57-3-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) 
provides specifically that: 
"Every . . . instrument in writing affecting real 
estate . . . shall, from the time of filing the same with 
the recorder for record, impart notice to all persons of 
the contents thereof; and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees 
and lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and take 
with notice." (emphasis added) 
Upon being placed on notice of a lien or claim, Appellant 
had a duty to inquire as to the nature thereof. This court 
held in Hayos v. Gibbs, 110 Utah 54, 59, 169 P.2d. 781 (1946), 
(citing from 66 C.J.S., p.1128, § 962): 
A purchaser of land is chargeable with notice of 
all conditions, restrictions, exceptions, or reservations 
appearing in his chain of title, or concerning which he 
is put on inquiry . . . 
The court further found in Hayes, citing Dellaughter v. Hargrove, 
40 S.W.2d. 253 (Texas) that: 
A purchaser is not only charged with notice of the 
contents of' deeds of his chain of title but, if the 
same contained anything that would put a prudent man 
upon inquiry, he is chargeable with notice of whatever 
an inquiry would reveal. (Citing cases) 
The restrictions appear in Defendant's chain of 
title - therefore he is chargeable with knowledge of 
the purpose for which the restrictions were made. 
See also Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d. 644, 1 U.2d 283 (1954). 
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• Clearly, Appellants had notice by the Plaintiff's 
recorded trust deed that Plaintiff claimed a lien by virtue 
thereof. Having such notice, they had a duty to inquire as 
to its basis, which inquiry would have disclosed both the 
existence and the validity of Plaintifffs lien. Having 
failed to make such inquiry, they cannot now complain. 
Appellants argue that "a description of such [antecedent 
indebtedness] may easily be inserted in the instrument." 
(App. Brief, p.19). Turnabout being fair play, Plaintiffs 
are compelled to note that Appellants could easily inquire 
of Plaintiff as to the nature of its lien, as they are 
required to do by law. However, how easy it may or may not 
have been to avoid the problem does not determine the validity 
of the consideration for the lien, which consideration 
perfected the trust deed at the time of its execution. The 
important fact is that the secured indebtedness was described 
and that description of the debt afforded notice to all 
subsequent creditors, including Appellant, of the actual 
scope of the debt. (See Smith v. Haertel, 244 P.2d. 377, 
379 (Colo. 1952)). 
POINT III 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Prior to trial of this matter, the parties stipulated 
that a reasonable award of attorney's fees to Plaintiff 
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(should the Court find in Plaintiff's favor) would be $4,500.00. 
The record shows that that stipulation concerned only attorney 
fees incurred through the course of trial and issuance of a 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure by the Trial Court (R.249-..;, 
251). Thus the award of attorney's fees by the trial court 
did not include attorney's fees incurred in the defense of 
this appeal. When this Court affirms the Trial Court6s 
Judgment, its award of costs should include reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiff in defense of this 
appeal. Thus, upon affirmance, the remand to the District 
Court should direct that court to determine and assess an 
appropriate attorney's fee to Plaintiff,, to be added to the 
Judgment heretofore rendered. 
CONCLUSION 
As discussed in Point I of this Brief, the promissory 
note and trust deed of March 14, 1973 are supported by ample 
consideration. In addition to being given as security for 
an antecedent debt, other good and valuable consideration 
for the trust deed and the promissory note it secures was 
given in that Plaintiff agreed to forbear from collection or 
suit upon the antecedent debt which was then in default, 
agreed to reduce the interest rate, agreed to release bicycles, 
agreed to extend the due date for 108 days, and agreed to 
release certain bicycles in order that Defendant Seiger 
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could effect a sale thereof. Additionally, the funds represented 
by the promissory note of March 14, 1973, were in fact 
disbursed on May 10, 1974. Only the disbursement of the 
proceeds of the note came after Appellant's claimed lien; 
all of the other consideration was in effect as of March 14, 
1973 and establishes Plaintiff's priority as of that date. 
Appellants' Brief wholly ignores the fact that other 
good and valuable consideration for execution and delivery 
of the note and trust deed were in effect as of the date of 
recording thereof. The cases cited by Appellant relate only 
to liens created in anticipation of future voluntary disburse-
ments of funds and are not pertinent here. 
The law is well settled, and Appellant's own authorities 
support the conclusion, that the mortgage entered into by 
Respondent in this case was issued for adequate consideration 
already in existence at the time of its execution and that 
Plaintiff's security interest in the subject property was 
therefore perfected as soon as the trust deed was recorded. 
It is respectfully submitted that the facts of this 
case and the applicable law compel a determination that 
Appellants' lien is not entitled to priority over Plaintiff's 
lien. Accordingly, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment of the Trial Court must be affirmed. 
Interestingly, if Appellants' contention is correct, 
they have argued themselves to the bottom of the priority 
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list. According to their argument, the actual date of 
disbursement of funds under a promissory note secured by a 
trust deed is an essential element of proof in foreclosure 
of that trust deed. Appellants introduced no evidence as to 
the date of disbursement of loan proceeds, their witness 
having testified only that funds were advanced for the 
account of Mr. and Mrs. Timothy (R.231). Thus, having failed 
to establish the date of disbursement, and following Appellants' 
argument to its logical conclusion, they must fall behind all of 
the other Defendants in priority of claims. We doubt that 
Appellants seek such a result. 
The findings of the trial court should be reversed on appeal 
only when the lower court was clearly in error. The Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the trial court in this 
case being clearly supported by the facts and the law, its 
Judgment must be affirmed, and the case remanded to the District 
Court for award to Respondent cf its attorney fees and costs 
incurred on appeal. * 
Respectfully submitted this ^ d^ rf of October, 1975. 
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